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The Constitution of Cultural  
Modernity
I.
The ›single idea‹ of culture, the problem of cul-
ture that Georg Lukács bequeathed to his Buda-
pest pupils was one that Ferenc Feher, Agnes 
Heller and György Márkus were to address in 
different ways after their break with the ruling 
Soviet orthodoxy in Hungary and their emigra-
tion to Australia. The problem of culture, more 
exactly, the question of Enlightenment and cul-
ture became the primary focus of Márkus’s work 
in Sydney. His theorization of modern culture as 
tied to the open articulation of the antinomies of 
modernity had as its immediate presupposition 
Márkus’s seminal contribution in Budapest to the 
renewal of critical theory: Marxism and Anthro-
pology. The Concept of »Human Essence« in the 
Philosophy of Marx (1978), followed by the fur-
ther elucidation of the concept of human essence 
in terms of the paradigm of production in the late 
seventies. In Marxism and Anthropology, Márkus 
argued that Marx conceives species-essence as 
intersubjectivity, understood as the historically 
produced social totality that is the product of 
human labour and its teleological relation to 
The essay situates György 
Markus’s key writings 
on cultural modernity in 
relation to Kant and Hegel’s 
conception of modern 
society as a society that 
knows itself as culture. 
The reconstruction of 
Markus’s theory has the 
function of identifying new 
dimensions of his theory in 
relation to the tradition of 
modern cultural critique. 
Markus’s rethinking of 
high culture in terms of 
the paradoxical unity of 
the arts and the sciences 
is central to his revision of 
this tradition. He replaces 
the totalizing narratives of 
the crisis of culture by the 
self-regulating constitution 
of a society of culture, 
which owes its vitality to the 
recurrent disputes between 
the Enlightenment and 
Romanticism.
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nature. The world that is given to humans is an already existing, historically 
produced objectivity, reproduced and changed through the process of ap-
propriation that presupposes the selection of ends and means. Appropriation 
is therefore an open, undetermined process by which human essence – the 
human capacity to be, in Marx’s words, a ›universal and therefore free be-
ing‹ (Estranged Labour) – can unfold in and through social development. 
Once Marx’s historically open conception of human essence is grasped, the 
mechanistic understanding of historical determinism is demolished and, as 
Márkus will go on to show in his acute analysis of Marx’s practical-social 
rationality, the paradigm of production must be understood as a project that 
articulates human essence as a principally unlimited tendency for progress. 
Or more exactly, precisely qua project the paradigm of production is only 
one among competing historical alternatives in relation to social develop-
ment. Marxism and Anthropology thus lays the groundwork in the 1960s 
for the ever more radical revisionism that culminates in the joint critique 
of the Soviet system of power in Dictatorship Over Needs by Feher, Heller 
and Márkus (1983) and in Márkus’s elucidation of the paradigm of produc-
tion in Marx. It is not by chance that Life and the Soul: The Young Lukacs 
and the Problem of Culture is the one essay from Márkus’s Budapest years 
that is included in the most important collection of his Australian essays, 
Culture, Science, Society (2011). It forms the bridge between the legacy of 
Lukács and the enduring theme of Western Marxism – the crisis of culture 
in modernity – and the main concern of Márkus’s work in Australia.
To understand the questions that Márkus’s post-Marxist theory of cul-
tural modernity seeks to answer, we need to go back to Lukács’s pre-Marxist 
search for answers to the problem of culture in modernity. Life and Soul: The 
Young Lukács and the Problem of Culture is pivotal here. As indicated, the 
essay looks back to the ›single idea‹ of Lukács and Western Marxism – the 
problem of culture – and points forward to the ›single idea‹ of Márkus’s work 
from the early 1980s on: what he was to call ›the constitution of cultural 
modernity‹.1 The Lukácsian problem of culture is transformed in Márkus 
into the paradoxical unity of culture. The problem of culture, so central 
to Lukács and Western Marxism, derives, however, from the paradoxes 
inherent in the Enlightenment conception of culture that were given their 
fundamental, foundational expression in Kant and Hegel.
The opposing conceptions of culture in Hegel and Kant – the philo-
sophical-historical and the metaphysical – define the parameters of Lukács’s 
problem of culture. If culture signified for Lukács the form that unifies all 
1 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society. The Constitution of Cultural Modernity.
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dimensions of life into a totality and if only in such an authentic totality can 
art and philosophy cease to be alienated from life, the deciding question of 
culture is this: Is a life free of alienation possible? »The issue«, in Márkus’s 
words, »is whether the conditions of the age in which he [Lukács] lived was 
an expression of the existential and ontological tragedy of culture or of a 
historical crisis from which recovery was possible.«2 Ontological tragedy 
or historical crisis? Lukács’s first answer was historical in the form of the 
comparison between classical tragedy and modern drama in History of 
Modern Drama (Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des modernen Dramas [1909]) 
and between Greek and Christian epic and the modern novel in The Theory 
of the Novel (Die Theorie des Romans [1916]), which was originally intend-
ed as the introduction to a study of Dostoevsky and his adumbration of a 
utopia of authentic life beyond alienation. Lukács’s contrast between the 
organic totality of authentic culture and the fallen world of god-forsaken 
modernity demonstrates the historical reversal of the relationship between 
life and culture, life and the work of art. Authentic culture gave meaning to 
the work of art and in turn art gave the highest expression to the totality of 
life. In the condition of modern alienation, however, the artwork becomes 
the surrogate for the lost totality of the past. And as such it has a double role. 
On the one hand, it is called to give meaning here and now to alienated life by 
objectifying and giving form to the split between soul and world, individual 
and society, inner values and external institutions. On the other hand, as the 
highest exemplification of totality the artwork becomes the redemptive other 
that points to the possibility of a world beyond alienation. The affinities to 
Nietzsche’s critique of modern culture are evident. The Theory of the Novel 
parallels Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music. Dostoevsky 
embodied for the young Lukács the redemptive promise, as did Wagner for 
the young Nietzsche, of a coming age of authentic culture. The existential 
truth of the artwork as the utopia of authentic life for the young Lukács or 
as the defetishizing objectivation of the ›generic‹ forms of human activity in 
the late Specificity of the Aesthetic (Eigenart des Ästhetischen [1963]) reveal 
the underlying continuity of Lukács’s pre-Marxist and Marxist thinking 
about the place and function of art in social life.
It was the young Hegelian Lukács who was so important for Adorno 
and Benjamin (but also for Bakhtin’s own Dostoevsky book, Problems of 
the Novel), not the unknown Lukács of the Heidelberg manuscripts on 
aesthetics, written between 1912 and 1918, abandoned by Lukács and not 
2 Ibid., p. 527.
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published until 1974, edited by György Márkus.3 The motivation of the 
Heidelberg manuscripts remained the crisis of modern culture, but the 
deciding question was now Kantian: Works of art exist, how are they pos-
sible? This question replaces the Hegelian narrative of the loss of authentic 
culture with the question of the transcendental, that is, systemic, conditions 
of possibility of the work of art. It meant the acceptance of the ontological 
tragedy of culture, the acceptance that works of art, like all great cultural 
objectivations, can transcend alienation, but they cannot abolish it.4 Iron-
ically this metaphysical resignation, which confirmed the impossibility 
of authentic culture and could only be compensated by the retreat to the 
›redeeming power of form‹,5 opened up fruitful theoretical possibilities cast 
aside by Lukács in 1918, which were to find their continuation in Márkus’s 
own theory of cultural modernity.
The presuppositions of Márkus’s theory of modern society as the soci-
ety that knows itself as culture are given in Kant and Hegel’s interpretation 
of enlightened society. Despite their fundamental differences, Kant and 
Hegel in Márkus’s reading share a common sense of the practical limits of 
Enlightenment. Kant’s optimism regarding the existence of a public capa-
ble of enlightening itself rested on the conviction that freedom of thought 
went hand in hand with freedom of trade, specifically a free book market. 
The public’s preference for novels and romances rather than ideas meant, 
however, that the commercialization of literature had betrayed the ends of 
Enlightenment.6 Kant’s optimism was defeated by the gulf between his un-
derstanding of the autonomy of the public sphere, defined by the normative 
roles of author and reader, and the actual interests of authors, readers and 
thus of publishers. The virtuous circle of the public sphere is shadowed by the 
vicious circle of private interest: Adorno’s analysis of the ›culture industry‹ 
spells out the dialectic of enlightenment in modern society that is unable 
to bridge the gulf between the Enlightenment as social-historical project 
and its practical realisation.7
In the essay The Hegelian Conception of Culture, Márkus reconstructs 
Hegel’s understanding of cultural modernity as the end result of the 
world-historical process of the growth in self-consciousness, the process 
that Hegel called ›Bildung‹, which covers both collective and individual 
3 Lukács: Frühe Schriften zur Ästhetik, 2 Vol.
4 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society, p. 537.
5 Ibid., p. 534.
6 Ibid., p. 394–396.
7 Adorno: Culture and Administration.
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cultivation. Culture conceived as ›Bildung‹ reflects Hegel’s commitment to 
the fundamental idea of the Enlightenment, »the emancipation of rational 
and self-determining individuality, for whom the cultivation of reason and 
will is a value-in-itself«.8 But Hegel’s autonomous individual, like Kant’s 
self-enlightening public, is a postulate, confined in practice to the few. Even 
though modernity is the epoch of ›Bildung‹ that knows itself as culture, rec-
ognizes its institutions as those created and sustained by human activities, it 
is nevertheless challenged to effectively realize the reciprocity of individual 
cultivation and the general culture of society9 that had once been the accom-
plishment and actuality of historical, that is, traditional, cultures. Hegel’s 
dialectic of Enlightenment arises from the two causes that go to the heart 
of ›the problem of culture‹, which so resonated in cultural critique from the 
Romantics to Nietzsche and Heidegger, Simmel and Weber, and Western 
Marxism. The one cause lies with the progress of Spirit to self-consciousness, 
the other in the division of labour and the differentiation of the social totality 
together with the resultant growth in complexity: The one expresses and 
reflects the historical process of the dissolution of spiritual unity, the other 
expresses and reflects the historical process of ever-increasing alienation.
The loss of a spiritual home haunted the nineteenth century and beyond. 
It turned secularization into the religion of the loss of religion, the religion 
of mourning for the lost totality of culture. Hegel’s concern, lay, however, not 
with the cultural pessimism of the few but with the socio-cultural gulf that 
had opened up between the educated elite and the mass of the population, 
brought about by the decline of religion and shared beliefs. Hegel shared 
Kant’s doubts as to the possibility of a self-determining public. Of the three 
historical forms of the absolute and the divine – art, religion, philosophy – 
only philosophy could now meet the highest needs of enlightened society. 
Self-enlightenment remained, however, the privilege and preserve of the 
few now that religion had lost its socially binding power. For Márkus, the 
outcome is a deeply paradoxical conception of modernity:
The only society that makes progress into its own inherent principle, and thereby ends 
›history‹ can progress only on the basis of a dead cultural tradition, a tradition which 
its development robbed of spiritual creativity and forced into a merely private sphere.10
Modernity’s destruction of all cultural traditional is epitomized by the muse-
um, the bourgeoisie’s monument to Hegel’s paradox of progress. The cultural 
treasures of the museum make manifest the spiritual impoverishment of 
8 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society, p. 407.
9 Ibid., p. 408–409.
10 Ibid., p. 413.
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modern individuals, emancipated from traditional bonds. This emancipation 
signifies for Márkus »the progressive emptying of the individual from all sub-
stantive contents and aims« as the alienating consequence of »the progressive 
transformation of each sphere of the institutional order into an autonomous 
mechanism which, driven by its objective logic, makes more and more narrow, 
rigid, and impersonal requirements and demands upon the individual«.11
It is at this point – the transformation of substance into function (to 
borrow Ernst Cassirer’s title) – that we must pause. Márkus’s reconstruction 
of the contradictions of cultural modernity, exemplified in Kant and Hegel’s 
recognition of the dialectic of Enlightenment, seems to pose impossible 
obstacles to any possible solution to the ›single thought‹ of culture of the 
young Lukács and in Western Marxism. And this is indeed the case, there 
is no ›solution‹ to the problem of culture when it is conceived in post-He-
gelian terms of historical disenchantment. Lukács himself recognised the 
theoretical impasse when he turned from Hegel back to Kant in his Hei-
delberg writings on aesthetics between 1912 and 1918. And despite the 
fact that Lukács had not abandoned his search for an absolute answer to 
the problem of culture, the central place that the work of art takes in the 
Heidelberg Philosophy of Art12 and the Heidelberg Aesthetics13 provides the 
crucial stepping stone to Márkus’s theory of the high culture of modernity.
II.
Lukács absolutized the work of art as an aesthetic totality of experience, 
captured in the unity of objective form and subjective spontaneity, compa-
rable to Schelling’s ›deduction of the art work‹ in his early System of Tran-
scendental Idealism (System des transzendentalen Idealismus) as the absolute 
coincidence of subject and object, the conscious and the unconscious. In 
the earlier Heidelberg Philosophy of Art, the work is grasped as the solution 
to the fundamental contradictions of life in that it presents qua aesthetic 
totality the a priori of all actual experience. In the Heidelberg Aesthetics, 
however, the Kantian question of the conditions of possibility of works of 
art, as distinct from the fact that works of art exist, can be answered only in 
the form of a paradoxical absolute, as befits Lukács’s own description of the 
11 Ibid., p. 407.
12 Lukács: Frühe Schriften zur Ästhetik 1. Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst (1912–1914). Hereafter 
cited as Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst.
13 Lukács: Frühe Schriften zur Ästhetik 2. Heidelberger Ästhetik (1916–1918). Hereafter cited as 
Heidelberger Ästhetik.
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intention of his aesthetics as a reverent ›negative theology‹.14 The condition 
of the work’s possibility resides in the pre-established harmony of form and 
content. The immanent validity of the work, based on the closed system of 
the internal relations of its constituent elements, makes it the sole source 
of value in the aesthetic sphere. Precisely this absolute transcendence of 
the work in relation to both empirical authors and recipients determines 
the normativity of production and reception, objectified in the work. The 
normative relationship between Author, Work, and Recipient, subsumed 
in the absolute transcendence of the work, presents what we might call the 
›absolute‹ schema of Márkus’s own triad of Author, Work and Recipient. 
Lukács’s answer to the Kantian question needs to be ›de-theologized‹ before 
it can be appropriated, before the turn from Hegel to Kant can be completed. 
The final step concerns the Lukácsian concept of ›form‹. As Márkus points 
out, the concept of form is more comprehensive than that of the ›work‹:
For Lukács, form designates all the functions connected with the creation of meaning. It 
enables the multiplicity of facts, events and all the other elements of life to be arranged 
into meaningful structures, organised patterns of meaning. (Accordingly, form is related 
not only to the sphere of »absolute spirit« but also to that of »objective spirit«.)15
Lukács’s concept of form is general enough to encompass and designate 
not only the congruence of life and works in authentic culture but also the 
internal principle of objectivation and validity particular to the modern 
differentiated spheres of the constitution of meaning. In the first chapter of 
the Heidelberg Aesthetics, Lukács defines his own position as a rejection of 
Hegel’s reduction of all forms of transcendental constitution to one single 
logical type in favour of the plurality and autonomy of the separate spheres.16 
If the aesthetic validity of the work of art is still for Lukács absolute, it does 
not mean, however, as we have seen, that the work of art can abolish alien-
ation. Thus, whether Lukács turns to Hegel or to Kant they only confirm 
the problem of culture in modernity and hence his own aesthetics and the 
aesthetic theory of Benjamin and Adorno as negative theology.
The final step from Hegelian substance to (neo-)Kantian function 
remains to be taken. Between Lukács and Márkus’s theory of cultural mo-
dernity stands Ernst Cassirer’s studies in the conditions of intersubjective 
validity in the natural and the cultural sciences.17 Although Cassirer ex-
panded his early work on epistemological problems in modern philosophy 
14 Lukács: Heidelberger Ästhetik, p. 274 (Germ. ›negative Theologie‹).
15 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society, p. 535, emphasis in the original.
16 Ibid., p. 235.
17 See the discussion of Cassirer and his ›path-breaking‹ Substanzbegriff: ibid., p. 499–520.
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and sciences18 to a general philosophy of symbolic forms covering the arts 
and the sciences (1923–1929), his crucial contribution for our purposes lies 
in his functional theory of objectivity, which resides not in the work itself, 
that is, not in the work’s immanent system of relations, but in the system 
of relations within which the work is itself possible. This functional system 
of relations in the arts, humanities and sciences constitutes the conditions 
of production in the high culture of modernity, whose products have for 
Márkus the following features in common – objectivation, innovation, 
dematerialisation, and autonomy.19 The work as ideal object, that is, as a 
dematerialized complex of meaning, is for Márkus ›autotelic‹, valuable in 
itself, ›autonomous‹, independent of external subordination, and ›autoch-
thonous‹, determined by its own internal logic regulated by the normative 
values of the sphere. These normative values are themselves products of a 
functional theory of objectivity that requires recognition of the historical 
relativity of norms. As Cassirer writes:
That we [in science] find only a relative stopping point, that we therefore have to treat the 
categories, under which we consider the historical process itself, themselves as variable 
and capable of change, is obviously correct: but this kind of relativity does not indicate 
the limits but rather the particular life of cognition.20
Cassirer’s defence and justification of ›the particular life of cognition‹ is 
specifically modern, it describes the modern system of culture as one for 
which historical change, categorical relativity and open-endedness are con-
stitutive. Lukács’s conundrum of historicity and timelessness in the artwork 
that he could only resolve metaphysically21 is resolved with Cassirer into 
the empirical functioning of the cultural and the natural sciences, which 
derive their intersubjective validity in the case of science by reference to 
the universal laws of nature and in the case of culture through the pos-
sibility of universal meaning that transcends the time-bound nature of 
cultural creations through the open-ended historical process of reception 
and re-interpretation. Cassirer’s systematization of Kant’s two realms of 
reason and imagination in The Logic of the Cultural Sciences (Zur Logik 
der Kulturwissenschaften [1942]) forms the epistemological background 
18 Cassirer: Das Erkenntnisproblem.
19 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society, p. 22.
20 Cassirer: Das Erkenntnisproblem, p. 16, emphasis in the original, trans. D. R. (»Daß wir in ihr 
[der Wissenschaft] immer nur einen relativen Stützpunkt finden, daß wir somit die Kategorien, 
unter denen wir den geschichtlichen Prozeß betrachten, selbst veränderlich und wandlungsfähig 
erhalten müssen, ist freilich richtig: aber diese Art der Relativität bezeichnet nicht die Schranke, 
sondern das eigentliche Leben der Erkenntnis.«)
21 Lukács: Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst, p. 151–232.
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to Márkus’s theory of cultural modernity. The two key essays here are A 
Society of Culture: The Constitution of Cultural Modernity (1994)22 and The 
Paradoxical Unity of Culture: The Arts and the Sciences (2003).23
The two dimensions of Márkus’s theory are 1) the structure of validity 
that is common to the arts and the sciences and allows us to speak of their 
paradoxical unity and 2) the historicity qua project of the high culture of 
modernity. I leave the discussion of the historicity of ›classical‹ cultural 
modernity to Part III as it involves the question of the relationship between 
classical modern and contemporary global modernity, in order to focus here 
on the unifying conceptual scheme that enables Márkus to articulate the 
basic similarities and the fundamental differences between the two domains 
of the arts and the sciences. He calls this scheme the ›cultural relation‹ that 
embraces the three functional roles of Author-Work-Recipient, each of 
which is defined by the normative expectations and requirements of the role. 
These normative roles, however, do not prescriptively determine the actual character of 
these practices, nor the effective evaluative criteria of their results. They are (in Kantian 
terminology) not of constitutive, but only of regulative character. They only indicate 
delimiting conditions that ought to be met if something is to be regarded as pertaining 
to the general realm and to a particular domain of culture.24
This normativity regulates not only what belongs to the respective domains 
but equally who has the right to participate. The high, as opposed to the 
low, culture of modernity is not open to everyone.
Márkus’s regulative framework is minimal but it delivers a great deal 
precisely by refraining from solving ›the problem of culture‹. The para-
doxical unity of culture is underpinned by this methodological abstention, 
which replaces the grand narratives of the crisis of culture in modernity by 
the self-regulating constitution of a society of culture. Against the whole 
German tradition of cultural critique, Márkus defends with Cassirer the 
Kantian conception of the high culture of modernity as the successor to 
Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. He legitimizes the ›particular life of cognition‹ of 
this culture and thereby modernity in its own right against the negations of 
the legitimacy of modernity explicit or implicit in the cultural pessimism 
of critical theory in the wide sense.
1. Márkus refuses the narratives of the tragedy of culture, the death of 
art, which all in their different ways rewrite the Hegelian enlightenment 
of art in terms of the deadly hostility of science to art. Whether we speak 
22 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society, p. 15–35.
23 Ibid., p. 59–80.
24 Ibid., p. 61.
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of Socratic enlightenment (Nietzsche), alienation and reification (Lukács), 
disenchantment (Weber), rationalisation (Adorno) or Heidegger’s ›Gestell‹, 
the progress of the sciences and knowledge is presented as the nemesis of art.
2. The antithetically destructive relationship between the arts and 
sciences is replaced by the complementarity of the two domains, which is 
understood as essential to the ongoing vitality and reproduction of high 
culture. Driven by the ever renewed disputes between the two main ideo-
logical programmes of the moderns, Enlightenment and Romanticism, the 
project of cultural modernity necessarily takes on the general character of 
critique, constantly tempted, however, to totalizing conclusions that deny 
the legitimacy of modernity.25 Márkus’s insistence on the paradoxical unity 
of culture as the condition of its functioning is directed precisely at the 
fatal illusions and consequences of all such simultaneously totalizing and 
one-sided critiques that claim to overcome the antinomies of the modern 
condition or that in denouncing the dialectic of enlightenment fall victim 
to the dialectic of romanticism.26
3. The autonomy of the arts and the sciences as self-regulating domains, 
separated from direct social functions, insulates normativity from all over-
riding external demands at the same time as it makes normativity a function 
of the evolving and changing historical system. Márkus’s account is thus 
in no way tied to a terminal vision of modernity and the decadence of its 
culture. There are no gods, old or new, waiting to save us. Rather, the high 
culture of modernity is a historical phenomenon that is classical because 
it came closest to realizing the Kantian conception of modern society as a 
society of culture. Its historical limits indicate the remit of Márkus’s theo-
ry but not the limits of the evolving and changing cultural creativity and 
self-understanding of modern society. If this was not the interest or focus of 
Márkus’s published writings on culture (even though he had long worked on 
a comparative analysis of theories of mass culture), they do contain highly 
relevant pointers towards theorizing contemporary culture.
III.
Márkus’s reconciliation of normative structure and historical system 
is itself, however, historical. His theory describes the high culture of 
25 Ibid., p. 74–80.
26 See Roberts/Murphy: Dialectic of Romanticism.
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classical (European) modernity from the late eighteenth century to the 
end of the Second World War. The two key distinctions of his theory are 
that between the arts and the sciences and that between high and low 
culture. As we have seen, the vitality and capacity for self-reproduction 
that defined high culture came from the productive tension between and 
essential complementarity of the two domains of the arts and sciences. 
There was no such productive complementarity, however, between the 
spheres of high and low culture, produced and reproduced primarily by 
the segmentation and commodification of the market for cultural goods. 
But in both respects the culture of classical modernity was built around 
processes of differentiation, normative in relation to the arts and sciences, 
economic in relation to the separate interests of recipients of high and low 
culture. This basic structure of differentiation still applies to contempo-
rary culture, but it no longer plays the defining role that it did for modern 
culture. The arts and the sciences still constitute separate domains, they 
still retain their normative criteria, even though they can no longer po-
lice and autonomously determine their borders as they once could. This 
erosion of borders points to the new forms of de-differentiating dynamics 
reshaping contemporary culture that are tied up with the penetration of 
the life world by aestheticization and scientization. We could say that 
the paradoxical unity of high culture has dis/appeared into the diffused 
ubiquity of scientific and aesthetic attitudes.
Science and the scientific attitude have provided the dominant ideolo-
gy of modernity since the Enlightenment. The social effects in the form of 
the rationalization of the workplace and the bureaucratization of organi-
zations have taken on a new competitive intensity since the Second World 
War and the progressive universalization of the developmental model of 
the nation-state. The same processes of competitive rationalization are at 
work in the aesthetic colonization of the life world in relation to products 
and consumers. This operative complementarity only becomes culturally 
interesting, however, when this dual penetration of work and leisure takes 
on a new quality through the inter-penetration of aestheticization and 
scientization to produce possibilities of creative hybridization that mirror 
and are mirrored in the inter-penetration of high and low culture. To sum 
up these introductory comments: The paradoxical unity of high culture has 
been transformed into the paradoxical unity of high and low culture – a 
unity, defined not by the complementarity of the differentiated spheres 
of the arts and sciences but by their inter-penetration as it is reflected in 
contemporary culture on the level of both content and form. As regards 
content, I am thinking here of the importance of science-fiction for crit-
Roberts: Constitution of Cultural Modernity ZGB 29/2020, 229–244
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ical reflection on science and technology, as regards form I am thinking 
of the appropriation of the creative possibilities of technology in the arts.
The causes of the disintegration of the high culture of modernity are 
manifold, but they can be summed up in terms of the erosion of the norma-
tive criteria of its two domains from both internal and external reasons. In 
A Society of Culture Márkus lists some of the key factors that have made the 
classical conception of high culture inapplicable to contemporary practices. 
De-objectivation undoes the idea of the work as a self-subsisting ideal object, 
dissolving it into unlimited data in the sciences or into ephemeral event or 
happening in art; rematerialization reduces the work as a meaning-com-
plex to a series of self-referential operations in science or to an object in art 
that foregrounds the material media of communication. In relation to the 
author, novelty is divorced from the creative subject, who disappears into 
the multiple authorship of scientific papers or whose death is proclaimed in 
art. In relation to reception, Márkus stresses the loss of autochthony and the 
consequent vitiation of the formal normative autonomy of the two domains, 
which he illustrates by reference to the effective suspension of the intersub-
jective validation of research results in the sciences under the pressure of 
the costs of verification and the interests of external funding.27 Although 
the modern arts have always been dependent on the art market and old and 
new forms of patronage, it is clear that the normative distinction between 
aesthetic and market criteria has largely lost its purchase. All these factors 
are negative indices of the decline and dissolution of the high culture of 
modernity. Nevertheless, despite the importance of the external influences 
of money and power at work here, we need to recognize that the internal 
processes dissolving the boundaries of high culture express the dynamics 
of historical change inherent in the Enlightenment conception of culture.
Emblematic of these changes is the transformation of the status of the 
artwork. In Lukács and Márkus, the work occupies the central place as 
the synthesis of production and reception. Modern aesthetic theory is the 
theory of the work of art as thing, as discrete object, and of works of art as 
the sole province of theory. The original meaning of aesthetics as referring 
to sensuous perception was thus narrowed down to the normative criteria 
of judgment that served to determine the borders of art proper from the 
crafts, handiwork, design and decoration or ›Kitsch‹. Aesthetic theory in 
this sense went hand in hand with the modern differentiation of the arts as 
a separate domain. The dis/appearance of the aesthetic sphere into aestheti-
cization of the lifeworld is reflected in the dis/appearance of the artwork 
27 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society, p. 30–32.
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into ambient happening, event, performance. Both are symptomatic of a 
fundamental process of de-differentiation that calls for a recovery of the 
original meaning of aesthetics as sensuous perception. This is the gist of 
Gernot Böhme’s argument for a new aesthetics that responds to aestheti-
cization and that has as its focus the production of atmospheric aura as 
opposed to auratic artworks.28
The works of cultural modernity are premised on the idea of originality, 
just as the idea of originality presupposes the existence of a tradition from 
which the new work departs. Conceived in terms of originality, tradition 
takes on two fundamental characteristics: It is a living tradition but one 
whose compass is constantly expanding. For the moderns, the aesthetic 
legacy has become a readily accessible source for recipients and an imagi-
native resource for artists, progressively incorporating the arts of the past 
in all their variety and forms.29 As Márkus writes in The Paradoxical Unity 
of Culture, whether one understands this expansion of aesthetic tradition 
as a sign of the »incredible openness« or of the »insatiable cultural impe-
rialism« of the moderns:
The history of modern art is also that of the recovery and absorption of forgotten or alien 
pasts – and this process is still going on. [...] Tradition now lacks what it was always meant 
to be – a binding force for contemporary practice. But as the power of tradition dissipates, 
its weight constantly increases.30
Márkus sums up this dialectic of historicization together with the corre-
sponding double transgression of the boundaries of art as follows:
This acceleration and radicalisation of the production of novelty, however, only contributes 
to the expansion of the musealised tradition, which spurs it on. As the temporal distance 
between the outdated old and the radically new becomes ever shorter, the life-span of the 
new, in which it counts as novel, of contemporary relevance, diminishes too. The more 
radical the novelty the more rapidly it becomes musealised. The more artistic practice 
seems to approximate to the state of permanent revolution, the more the art work of the 
future turns immediately into the artwork of the past.31
Contemporary art does not exist in isolation, it is part of a global market for 
art and entertainment, which in turn is part of a global consumer market 
for tangible and intangible goods, animated by advertising, an event- and 
experience-culture, and tourism. The global art and entertainment indus-
tries, the culture and creative industries have comprehensively refashioned 
the cultural institutions of Western modernity – museums, galleries, opera 
28 Böhme: Atmosphäre.
29 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society, p. 66.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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houses, concert halls (along with universities) into commercial enterprises. 
Warhol was perhaps the first to have recognized that the two distinct func-
tions of the museum and the department store were on the way to the para-
doxical unity that has been consummated in the contemporary museum. 
It is no surprise that museums have achieved their greatest public success 
over recent years with the staging of exhibitions of fashion, which register 
the spectacle of the contemporary as the ›eternal return of the new‹. In turn 
digitalization has subsumed the genres of modernity – drama, novel, film, 
video games, information, news – in the one universal medium streamed 
into the home or mobile phone. The World Wide Web makes the art, ar-
chitecture, literature of the world available. Malraux’s imaginary museum 
of world art has become virtual reality in the cloud.
Can we still speak of contemporary culture as a Kantian project? I would 
like to suggest that the answer is yes, that despite the striking discontinuities 
the continuities are more significant and that we can indeed speak of an 
extrapolation of Márkus’s theory of cultural modernity. Modern and con-
temporary culture share the dialectical relationship with traditional culture 
that Márkus describes in Antinomies of Culture:
[...] [F]rom the viewpoint of the broad concept of culture, modern society appears as 
essentially deficient. But at the same time – and from the perspective of this very same 
concept – modernity takes on the character of the paradigmatic or ›most fully develo-
ped‹ culture because it is the culture which self-reflexively knows itself as culture. By 
recognizing all others as equal cultures, cultural modernity posits itself as more equal 
than others. It is its very particularity – that is, its self-reflexive character – that makes 
it universal: the recognition of other societies as ›cultures‹ confers on it the task and the 
right to assimilate/acquire/take into possession their ›cultural achievements‹ – of course, 
what it qualifies as such.32
This »right« and this »task« have now been taken over by the community 
of nations, who recognize, as indicated above, their common responsibility 
to preserve the natural and cultural heritage of mankind. It is a mark of the 
ongoing de-colonizing phase of globalization set in train by the Second 
World War, opening the way to the co-evolution of world society and the 
nation-state. 
Since 1945, some 140 new nation-states have been established, con-
structed by external cultural processes, which provide the global models for 
implementation of rationalized modernization (constitution, citizenship, 
educational system etc.), which the old civilizational patterns, religions 
and even fundamentalist rejections of universalistic modernization cannot 
resist and must adapt to. So, globalization and nation-states go together as 
32 Ibid., p. 642.
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the contemporary post-civilizational form of world society,33 in which ra-
tionalized modernity, according to John Meyer and John Boli, has become 
the »universalistic and inordinately successful form of the earlier Western 
religious and post-religious system«: 
The elites of world society share the belief that salvation lies in rationalized structures 
grounded in scientific and technological knowledge. The new religious elites are the 
professionals, researchers, scientists, and intellectuals who write secularized and uncon-
ditionally universalistic versions of the salvation story […] This belief is worldwide and 
structures the organization of social life almost everywhere.34
In one significant respect, however, there is a marked break between the 
modern and the contemporary. For Márkus, the intellectual was the prime 
carrier of the ideas of the Enlightenment and of the modern conception 
of society as culture. This is no longer the case. Intellectuals and modern 
intellectual culture have been pushed aside by the »the new religious elites« 
of world society now that the projects of Enlightenment and Romanticism 
have increasingly lost their relevance for »a very specific, a single group of 
social actors: the intellectuals«.35 Here Márkus has in mind the ›specialists‹ 
in cultural critique. It was they who »spearheaded the feuding projects of 
Enlightenment and Romanticism«.36 Today they are no longer needed. 
Their role has been taken over by the genuine experts: »the managers and 
PR persons of various cultural institutions and media, and their patrons 
and allies in social and political establishments«.37 Does this mean the end 
of what Márkus calls the often uneasy but persistent connection between 
culture and critique in modernity? Is rationalized modernity the conclu-
sion rather than the continuation of the project of Enlightenment? Or were 
Márkus’s intellectuals the last to be secularized in the present post-civiliza-
tional form of world society, based on the new sacred texts of the gospel of 
scientific-technological salvation that announces a new global technological 
civilization? These are not questions that I can answer. I can say, however, 
that Márkus’s theory of cultural modernity forms a legacy that surely has a 
role to play in the analysis of the paradoxes of global contemporary culture.
33 Redner: Beyond Civilization.
34 Meyer et al.: World Society and the Nation-State, p. 174.
35 Márkus: Culture, Science, Society, p. 652–653.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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